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ABSTRACT
The literature has devoted considerable attention to the
understanding of state institutions and rule of law in the
processes of democratization. However, despite the crucial
relevance of dynamic and repeated interactions between actors
and institutions in non-homogenous post-conﬂict societies, most
research lacks systematic analyses on the role of parliaments,
parties and party systems after civil wars. While several studies
have examined the eﬀects of electoral systems or veto rights after
power-sharing agreements, as well as the transformation of rebel
groups into political parties in post-conﬂict societies, the
development of parties within parliaments has been largely
ignored. Therefore, by combining conﬂict studies, institutional
design perspectives and peacebuilding approaches, this paper
presents a research agenda on the overlooked role played by
parliament as a crucial arena for a better analysis, in the long
term, of power-sharing mechanisms and state-building, post-war
political framing and narratives, ethnic outbidding and party
modernization strategies.
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Introduction
A crisis of what is called ‘liberal peace’ has recently emerged as a result of a growing array of
problems and failures. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have illustrated the setbacks
of international liberal peacebuilding (Newmann, Paris, & Richmond, 2009). Other
approaches, such as ‘hybrid peace’ or ‘resilience’, have radically questioned the main top-
down assumptions of Western humanitarian interventions (Chandler, 2004; Mac Ginty,
2010). At the same time, comparative politics literature has devoted considerable attention
to the understanding of state institutions and rule of law in the processes of democratization.
The literature has clariﬁed how political institutions can eﬀectively mitigate conﬂicts,
fostering inclusion and creating a pattern of behaviours around which expectations con-
verge (Hartzell, 1999). Local institutions can bring down conﬂicts between communities
while accommodation can soften the incompatibility of interests. The need has gradually
emerged among scholars to focus on the implementation of peace agreements as well as
on the dynamic interactions between actors, political institutions and exogenous factors in
non-homogenous post-conﬂict societies (Spears, 2000). However, the
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‘compartmentalization’ of current research on civil wars, conﬂict management, democra-
tization and peacebuilding hinders the development of systematic analyses on the dialec-
tic relation between conﬂicts and domestic institutions.
Recent analyses (Hensell & Gerdes, 2012; Grimm &Weiﬀen, 2018; Groß, 2018; Zürcher,
2018) in peacebuilding and democracy promotion have examined the relationship
between domestic elites and international actors, stressing the need to ‘disentangle
such complex interaction process’ (Groß, 2018, p. 304), looking at diﬀerent goals and
preferences. Despite such attempts, ‘insights into the nature and dynamics of this inter-
action remain scarce’ (Bunk, 2018, p. 323). A detailed investigation is especially required
to understand the strategic bargaining between domestic actors, whose role has been
‘overlooked’ by current debate (Grimm & Weiﬀen, 2018, p. 258). Among domestic
players in post-conﬂict societies, the literature has devoted little attention to the
repeated interactions between political parties in legislative contexts as well as to the
features and the institutionalization of parties, which aggregate and express political
demands.1
Rather than examining the relationship between domestic elites and international
actors, the main focus of this paper is the parliamentary interaction between political
parties in post-conﬂict societies. There are several studies that have examined the
eﬀects of electoral systems, veto rights or reserved seats after power-sharing agreements,
as well as the transformation of rebel groups into political parties in post-conﬂict societies.
Yet, despite some exceptions (Ishiyama, 2014; Reilly & Nordlund, 2008), there are few
studies concerning party development after elections, especiallywithin themore typical insti-
tutional context – the parliament – inwhich parties operate. Even though political institutions
are generally perceived as crucial for addressing exclusion and state fragility, and notwith-
standing the mounting interest on the implementation of peace agreements and power-
sharing, how parties develop their political activities in parliament has received ‘little atten-
tion’ (Kumar & de Zeeuw, 2008, p. 276). As stressed by Ishiyama (2014, pp. 425–426), there
is still ‘very little literature that addresses the evolution of party politics after civil wars’. In
line with Alﬁeri (2016, p. 234), scholars also ‘underestimate’ the importance of studying
parties in post-conﬂict in non-Western regions, such as Africa. Despite the increasing interest
devoted by civil war research to framing the grievances among the main political players, as
well as to emotions and ideologies, few studies2 have been conducted on the role of political
parties in crafting narratives and frames in post-conﬂict situations.
Furthermore, notwithstanding growing consideration to ethnic outbidding, ‘de-natio-
nalizing politics’, and ‘party modernization’ in peace process3, there aren’t systematic
(and cross-time) analyses of (local and national) parliamentary debates, which would
allow a detailed examination of the integration of elites and strategies of pragmatism,
cooperation and/or ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ in post-conﬂict societies (Moore, Loizides,
Sandal, & Lordos, 2014).
In short, the relationship between parties should be ‘more fully explored’ (Manning and
Smith 2018, p. 26). This paper aims at addressing such need, developing a research agenda
on parties in post-conﬂict parliaments, stressing the elements that deserve greater inter-
est, and advancing plausible hypotheses that can be tested in further studies.
The contribution of the paper to the current debate is threefold. First, we critically revise
the scholarly discussion on conﬂicts and institutions, advancing a typology that connects
diﬀerent branches of the literature, allowing focusing on the underrated role played by
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parties in post-war assemblies. Second, the paper identiﬁes the main paths – as well the
most signiﬁcant gaps – of the existing analyses on political parties in post-conﬂict societies.
Third, through selected empirical examples, the manuscript provides a potential research
agenda, advancing plausible hypothesis on political parties in post-conﬂict societies.
This paper proceeds as follows. After having illustrated the current debate on power-
sharing, conﬂicts and institutions, the dynamic interactions between actors are presented
as the most relevant aspect that deserves investigation by the literature. Hence, the paper
focuses on parties in post-conﬂict divided societies and, through empirical examples,
advances three arguments of a research agenda on parties within post-civil war parlia-
ments: the intergroup party dynamics in legislative arenas, the symbolic dimension and
methodological and normative unsolved problems in party development studies.
Finally, some preliminary conclusions are discussed.
Conﬂicts and institutions
There is a growing debate on current models of peace maintenance in the aftermath of
civil wars. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 779), peacebuilding is ‘an
attempt, after peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current
hostility and build capacities for conﬂict resolution’. UN peacebuilding strategies have
increasingly focused on institutionalization as a key component in solving conﬂicts. At
the same time, ‘neoliberal peacebuilding’ has been marked by mounting criticism over
the mainstream technical view of state-building and institutional reforms, which has
been largely discarded because it failed to take into account cultural, social and historical
needs (Groß & Grimm, 2016; Mac Ginty, 2010).
Nevertheless, several authors believe that there is still some space for ‘middle ground
analyses’ (Paris, 2004, p. 109) of the relationship between conﬂicts and institutions. On the
whole, the current debate is aﬀected by two main problems: the existing ‘compartmenta-
lization’ of research and the limited attention devoted to an ‘actor-oriented’ perspective
(i.e. the scarce interest towards the dynamic interaction among actors in post-conﬂict
after power-sharing).
First, although some connections have occurred in the literature, the integration of
diﬀerent branches of literature has been extremely limited. Comparative politics, democrati-
zation, peacebuilding, civil war and crisis management studies rarely integrate their analyses
and perspectives with the ﬁeld of post-conﬂict research. According to Grimm and Weiﬀen,
there has been an ‘evident lack of dialogue’ (2018, p. 263) between diﬀerent strands of the
literature, especially concerning the interaction between domestic and international actors.
Second, there is a growing need for systematic analyses that take into account what
Zürcher (2018) calls the dynamic process of bargaining among strategic players in post-
conﬂict. Also, for this reason, we should better look at the dynamic relationship
between types of conﬂicts and institutions. Especially dialectic long-term human inter-
actions, which represent crucial aspects in determining the successes or failures of peace-
building, deserve attention.4
There are manifold ‘dilemmas of peace-building’ (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008, p. 1), from elec-
toral design to state-building theory and practices in ‘war-to-democracy transitions’. But
power-sharing represents the most controversial dilemma. Do power-sharing mechanisms
enable or hinder the transition of a divided society towards democracy?
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Diﬀerent views emerge in the literature regarding the inﬂuence on peace and stability
of distinguished institutional designs (Caspersen, 2004; Sisk, 2013; Strøm, Gates, Graham,
& Strand, 2015). According to consociationalism, power-sharing allows a better represen-
tation of all the important groups in a divided society (Lijphart, 1977, 2002). Power-sharing
institutions are ‘intended to provide each group with a guarantee that it will have a
minimum level of representation within government’ (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2010, p. 9).
Recent research has tried to ‘disaggregate power-sharing’, investigating its components,
such as certain proportional electoral systems or as speciﬁc types of parliamentary
systems (Cammet & Malesky, 2012, p. 983).
Others have identiﬁed diﬀerent analytical dimensions of power sharing, such as inclus-
ive, dispersive and constraint power sharing (Strøm et al., 2015), assessing their diﬀerent
impact on democratic survival (Graham, Miller, & Strøm, 2017). In fact, power-sharing can
also aﬀect democratization negatively by excluding moderate elites or freezing ethnic div-
isions through group representation. ‘Centripetalism believes that the best way to manage
democracy in a divided society is […] to put in place institutional incentives for cross-
ethnic behaviours to encourage accommodation between rival groups’ (Reilly, 2010,
pp. 288–289).
Several authors (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2010) support integrative approaches to power-
sharing and centripetalism, which aim to reinforce the centre of a divided political spec-
trum through incentives for cooperation across ethnic lines. Binningsbo and Rustad
(2012) state that power-sharing is not a positive factor per se, but that it depends on
the type of institutional design and its implementation (e.g. resource distribution, land
reforms, etc.). This ‘ﬂexibility’ explains why the literature on the relationship between
regime type and civil war recurrence has fostered growing attempts to disaggregate the
concepts adopted in the empirical analyses, focusing on diﬀerent types of institutional
design (and their implementation).
Therefore, in line with the dynamic analysis of Graham et al. (2017), the paper oﬀers a
preliminary typology on institutions after power-sharing, moving away from compartmenta-
lization and linking the literature on peacebuilding with civil wars, democratization and
crisis management studies. The typology aims at systematizing and clarifying the above-
mentioned attempts to disaggregate key-concepts, going beyond a schematic division
between ‘stability’ or ‘political transformation’ as main goals of peacebuilding. This, in
turn, allows identifying an understudied area of research: the dynamic political confronta-
tion among parties within parliaments in post-conﬂict societies. We focus speciﬁcally on
post-war contexts because of the peculiar problems young democracies address in such
contexts: the legacy of political violence, armed groups that become parties, third (inter-
national) actors. Therefore, along with the process of institutionalization of parties and
party systems (Panebianco, 1988; Sartori, 1976), post-conﬂict democracies require that
parties dismiss violence and mitigate ethically or religiously-based radicalization. Because
of such problems the analysis of legislative interactions deserves speciﬁc attention.
A typology
The diﬀerent contexts where several forms of civil war and social conﬂict take place to
originate from diverse combinations of variables. By summarizing the vast literature on
international security, peace research and civil wars, it is possible to identify several
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‘frequent variables’ that shape contemporary conﬂicts. These variables are: the content of
the conﬂict, the number of conﬂicting groups and their relative strength, the territorial
concentration (without a mixed population) or dispersion (with a diverse population,
e.g. in Bosnia) of groups, the presence and collocation of signiﬁcant natural resources
(e.g. resource dispersion without centralized control, such as in Sierra Leone), institutional
legacies (Sriram & Zahar, 2009), the intensity and duration of conﬂicts (Kalyvas, 2006),
third-party interventions (Mattes & Savun, 2009) and past political and diplomatic
agreements.
Institutional solutions have to ﬁt into diﬀerent war contexts and prove to be appropri-
ate for diﬀerent kinds of problems. There are three ideal types of ‘context’: a centre/(ter-
ritorial or social) periphery conﬂict, where fundamental power resources are controlled
by a political centre, a polycentric order where there is not a centralized control of
power resources, and a fragmented context where fundamental resources are scattered.
The various ways of arranging power-sharing can be put together in diﬀerent combi-
nations, adapting them to each situation. Therefore, in order to systematize the current
debate, we outline an analytical partition of institutional solutions based on two general
dimensions: procedures (modalities of implementation) and domains (ﬁelds in which pro-
visions are implemented).
(A) Procedures. Institutional solutions are observable through a general parameter: goals.
The literature has stressed two fundamental post-conﬂict goals. The ﬁrst, which could
be labelled as ‘negative’ because it deals with the reduction or removal of threats per-
ceived by political players, concerns the management of the security dilemma. Gen-
erally, power-sharing provisions are related to this ﬁrst goal, which seems mainly
associated with the following features: short-term time horizon, ex ante solutions,
the relevant role of third part engagement. Each solution can be considered as
oriented towards the short, medium, or long term. Therefore, the timing and pace
of the institutional design in the diﬀerent phases of the post-war context are
crucial. Power-sharing focuses on lowering the level of distrust that hinders the
achievement of a commitment acceptable to the conﬂicting groups and, then, of a
stable agreement among them.
The second ‘positive’ goal aims to transform political culture and improve state capacities.
It looks more like a medium-/long-term objective and ex post solutions (left to free nego-
tiation of political player) because it strives to improve the eﬃciency of political systems
(especially responsiveness and accountability), and overcome the sources of conﬂict by
lessening ideological polarization and the harshness of identity cleavages, and by promot-
ing a larger sense of community.
(a) Domains. This category pertains to three parameters. The ﬁrst domain regards politics,
particularly the power allocation at the decision-making level, and concerns the distri-
bution among political groups of functions and roles within institutions, such as par-
liaments, cabinets and local powers. The second domain regards public
administrations and regards the allocation or regulation (e.g. removing the obstacles,
de rule or de facto, that hinder equal access) of the positions within administrative
structures, at both civilian and military level. The third concerns policies, speciﬁcally
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the agreements about the rules shaping contents and procedures of public policies.
Contents are both distributive (regarding the allocation of social resources among
individuals and groups) and regulative (on social and civil rights).
By combining the two above-mentioned criteria (goals and domains), we obtain an
exploratory classiﬁcation (Table 1) of the most important institutional solutions to conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst classiﬁcation, which includes most of the traditional power-sharing solutions,
stems from the combination of the three domains with the ‘negative’ goals, which aim to
lessen fear and insecurity. At the government level, for instance, we can ﬁnd consocia-
tional arrangements based on ex ante (i.e. not depending on electoral outcomes) distri-
bution of cabinet seats among political players (e.g. in Bosnia after Dayton). At the
administrative level, we refer to the proportional allocation of positions within armed
forces and bureaucracies to the diﬀerent segments of societies (for instance, South
Africa or Lebanon). Finally, at policies level, on the one hand, we can have solutions
relying on an ex ante allocation of the main social (material and symbolic) resources,
especially in countries rich of commodities (e.g. the ‘Agreement on Wealth Sharing’
between Sudan and South Sudan). On the other hand, indirectly, determined issues can
be excluded – ex ante – from the political agenda (religious or speciﬁc economic issues
for instances), or constrained by speciﬁc veto power assigned to the main political actors.
The second conﬁguration is related to ‘positive goals’, aiming to favour, on one side, the
political integration of deeply divided groups (especially by setting up inclusion mechan-
isms in nation-building) and, on the other side, to improve the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness
of the political system, assuring responsiveness (e.g. the capacity to produce public goods
and respond to the diﬀerent populations’ political claims). The parliamentary level involves
the long-term interactions among parties and their ideological and strategic transform-
ations linked to this continuous confrontation and compromise process, fostering
nation-building. Reconciliation and cooperation can indeed reduce uncertainty among
groups (e.g. Northern Ireland). The administrative level concerns all the choices that can
improve the eﬃciency and accountability of the diﬀerent branches of the state, favouring
state-building (e.g. the reforms of judicial systems). Finally, the policy process had to be
shaped in order to promote economic and social growth. We can ﬁnd two diﬀerent
arrangements. In the ﬁrst one, the range of choices is limited by some normative con-
straints (e.g. norms regulating the public budget). The second involves measures, even fos-
tered by the international community, explicitly directed at favouring (e.g. through
reforms or educational programmes) economic development and a less polarized political
culture.
Table 1. Near here – Institutions and power-sharing.
Goals
Domains ‘Negative goals’ ‘Positive goals’
Decision-
making
To enhance political inclusion and power-sharing
at the government level (regional and national
cabinets)
To enhance political inclusion and power-sharing at
the legislative level (parliaments, parties and
party systems)
Administration To promote a proportional allocation of seats and
oﬃces
To increase the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of
public services
Public policy To remove horizontal inequalities and the direct
negative eﬀects of natural resources
To remove vertical inequalities and the indirect
negative eﬀects of natural resources
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The literature has devoted considerable attention to all the elements in the two
conﬁgurations. With a relevant exception: the organized political confrontation among
parties within parliaments. Empirical analysis demonstrates how access to state power
(generally measured on the basis of inﬂuence over the executive, cabinet seats, etc.) is
a pivotal factor relating to the risk of conﬂict and its duration, as ‘discriminated groups
are even more prone to experience violence than excluded ones’ (Cederman, Gleditsch,
& Buhaug, 2013, p. 215). But parliament, as well as party development in legislative
arenas, is seldom at the centre of the analyses that look at the formal and informal arrange-
ments of junior partners in power-sharing regimes. However, power-sharing ‘within the
central executive’ is not the only way that ethnic inclusion can be implemented. The ana-
lyses of inclusive power-sharing at the legislative level are generally limited to reserved
seats, veto powers and electoral rules, underestimating the dynamic bargaining
between political parties after elections. While most research has focused on civil
society, a systematic examination of the implementation of ethnic inclusion in parliament
is lacking.
Parliaments are often an environment in which a party’s role and organization can be
strengthened, along with the process of institutionalization. Within parliaments, parties
negotiate on the allocation of the main resources among diﬀerent segments of popu-
lation, often inside speciﬁc and dedicated committees. This task encourages a growing
specialization and structuring of parties, anchoring them to the needs of the more impor-
tant social groups, and enhancing the connection between political institutions and
society. Within these arenas ‘catch-all parties’ or multi-ethic and national parties, also
because of speciﬁc electoral rules, may at times overcome parochial aﬃliations in
favour of taking in a larger cross-section. In a long-term process, parliaments may foster
the transformation of group attitudes, preferences and strategies, to better promote the
easier institutionalization, and pragmatism of political forces, even aﬀecting their identity.
The role of political parties might be relevant in the ‘administrative domain’ too. Parties,
which are ‘the central intermediate and intermediary structure between society and gov-
ernment’ (Sartori, 1976, p. IX), are essential for modern democracy because they perform
representative and institutional functions. Political parties have monitoring capacities, and
they are able to articulate and channel political demands originating from society. ‘As key
agents of both political development and conﬂict management, political parties should
play a critical role in post-conﬂict peacebuilding’ (Reilly, 2013, p. 88). Parties can
improve not only the state’s ability to understand and respond to social needs but also
the capability to persuade people to accept speciﬁc public policies, enhancing democratic
eﬀectiveness. Finally, the long-term interaction between parties within a parliamentary
context also reveals the crucial symbolic dimension of the dynamic relationship among
political actors in post-conﬂict societies.
In short, as shown by our typology, the literature should make an in-depth investigation
of the role of political parties within parliaments in post-conﬂict societies.
Political parties in post-conﬂict contexts: a growing (but still incomplete)
literature
Inclusive institutions reduce the fear of marginalization, increasing mutual conﬁdence
between rival groups. Repeated interactions ‘among elites in a context of power-sharing
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may facilitate reciprocal trust’ (Bunte & Vinson, 2016, p. 61).5 But how is it possible to sys-
tematically assess the implementation of bargaining and the elites’ intent to cooperate?
How can we better understand the dynamic interactions between local political players,
as well as their features, aims and interests? How can we examine the day-by-day
process of confrontation, cooperation, accommodation and modernization of parties in
post-conﬂict situations?
The analysis of political parties within parliaments after civil wars potentially allows an
answer to those questions by investigating elite agendas and their concrete willingness to
implement peace agreements. However, as stated by Ishiyama (2014, p. 427): ‘for a long
time there has been scant literature on party systems’ development in places where
civil wars have occurred’. Although the institutionalization of the party system (Pane-
bianco, 1988) tends to be problematic in new democracies (e.g. low levels of legitimacy
and weak roots in the society of political actors), political parties, especially ‘national
party politics’ that can overcome divisions across ethnic lines, remain ‘indispensable’ for
democratization. Indeed, political parties represent the link between people and state,
aggregating and articulating interests. Peacebuilding literature has usually adopted Sar-
tori’s (1976) minimalist deﬁnition of political parties as any ‘political group that presents
at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public oﬃce’.
This section, which provides an updated and critical review of a growing line of research
on the development of political parties after civil wars, paves the way for building a poten-
tial research agenda on political parties in post-conﬂict societies. In fact, we identify the
main gaps in current studies, revealing the absence of systematic analyses on the long-
term dynamic interactions between parties in the legislative arena.
The analyses of political parties in post-conﬂict societies follow diﬀerent analytical
approaches. Generally, we can distinguish two perspectives. The ﬁrst one tries to
examine the link between institutional variables and process variables (in terms of
choices and strategies of political actors). In this case, the behaviour of political parties
is connected with the incentives structure modelled by speciﬁc political institutions
(executive, parliament, electoral system, etc.). The second focuses on processes, aiming
at explaining the aftermath of civil war and social conﬂicts on the basis of the contingent
and various interactive strategies of parties.
However, studies that examine the impact of political institutions focus mainly on elec-
toral system and executives, largely neglecting the role of legislatures. In addition, analyses
that scrutinize the dynamic tactics and strategies of parties (e.g. rebel groups that become
parties) often don’t connect them to the constraints and opportunities of legislative
assemblies. Moreover, such studies are mostly focused on electoral competition, overlook-
ing other important phases, like the long-term inter-party interaction that takes place in
parliaments. In sum, we can highlight ﬁve general paths of the existing literature on pol-
itical parties in post-conﬂict societies.
First, an increasing body of research has focused on the transformation of rebel groups
into political parties (Wittig, 2016), by examining the factors that inﬂuence their organiz-
ational transformation (Lyons, 2016) or their electoral success (Manning & Smith, 2016,
2018), considering how the political career of former rebels varies (Gerdes, 2017) or
whether the inclusion of those groups promotes a durable peace (Marshall & Ishiyama,
2016).6 Most of such scholarship devoted speciﬁc attention to disarming and demobiliza-
tion and to the role of the international community in peacebuilding eﬀorts.
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However, as stated by Lyons (2016, pp. 1028), ‘until recently, scholars of political parties
paid relatively little attention to cases following civil war and the conﬂict resolution commu-
nity said little about the roles played by post-conﬂict parties in promoting peacebuilding’. In
conformity with Alﬁeri (2016, p. 235) ‘while there is a growing literature on the transform-
ations of armed groups into political parties as part of wider peace-building initiatives, the
issue of how parties operate, organize and mobilize beyond the transitional phase is not
studied enough’. If the political participation of former rebels in democratic process has
been recently assessed (Manning, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2010), a cross-time analysis of their inter-
actions, behaviours and rhetoric within political parties in legislative arena is still missing.
Second, other scholars have analysed parties and elections in post-war scenarios, focus-
ing especially on the inﬂuence of electoral laws and party regulation on the nature of pol-
itical parties (Bogaards, 2000). A peculiar attention has been devoted to proportional
representation (PR) electoral system, due to its supposed ability to ‘integrate groups’
(Taylor, 2005, p. 455) and minorities, or to promote stability by fostering ‘party discipline’
(Cammet & Malesky, 2012, p. 982) through closed-list PR. Parties and party leaders’ strat-
egies to secure a voter base and international support for political party development have
also been examined (Manning, 2007). Moving beyond Eurocentrism, recent research has
also explored the factors (e.g. colonial administration, periods of military rule, etc.) that
shape party competition in Africa, Asia and Latin America (de Zeeuw, 2010).
However, the eﬀective parliamentary attitudes of MPs after post-war elections (e.g. the
supposed marginalized behaviour of MPs elected with reserved seats in the legislative
arena) have been rarely scrutinized by longitudinal analyses. Moreover, the diﬀerences
between electoral and parliamentary contexts are important also for the divergent incen-
tives structure they produce. Indeed, electoral competition induces parties to diﬀerentiate
each other, stressing the ambitious goals set by their propaganda. Within parliaments,
instead, they are more easily encouraged to adopt strategies of cooperation and compro-
mise (exploiting, for instance, the opportunities of logrolling and of the facilities linked to
parliamentary committees).
A third path of the literature has scrutinized party formation and the regulation of
parties in post conﬂict (Reilly & Nordlund, 2008). Scholars have investigated ‘formal
elements’ concerning parties and power-sharing agreements, such as the eﬀects of
veto-rights (Ram & Strøm, 2014) and reserved seats to minorities (Reynolds, 2005). None-
theless, studies on the speciﬁc parliamentary behaviours of the legislators in reserved seats
are still lacking. Such research could also be helpful in explaining the ‘tendency to split’
(Hulsey, 2015, p. 521) of parties in ethnically divided societies before it occurs.
Four, an increasing interest emerged also regarding ethnic outbidding and party mod-
ernization strategies in contexts of peace processes. Indeed, several authors (Gormley-
Heenan & MacGinty, 2008; Garry, 2014) have pointed out the capabilities of ethnonational
parties to combine – depending on the issue – outbidding politics and ethnic tribune
appeals with modernization strategies and pragmatic positions. Existing analyses mainly
trace such combination by looking at the electoral competition, voting behaviour, or
public debates. Yet, systematic research on the parliamentary debates over crucial
issues is absent, despite the fact that legislative arenas would provide excellent sources
to assess conciliatory or confrontational attitudes.
Five, current research on civil wars and peacebuilding has gradually adopted frame and
narrative analyses on parties in post-conﬂict. Cederman et al. (2013) recently focused on the
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interactions between the state and the actors at intermediate levels of aggregation (such as
ethnic groups and rebels), revealing the impact of grievances on civil wars and the role
played by ethnic nationalism in fuelling conﬂicts. The authors examined the causal
pathway in the process ‘from inequalities to grievances’, by looking at: group identiﬁcation,
intergroup comparison, the evaluation of injustice, and framing and blaming.
The interaction among parties in parliament allows all these elements to be studied
from a diﬀerent perspective, with speciﬁc attention devoted to ‘framing’. Moreover,
some authors have focused on the types of ‘eﬀective frames’ adopted by ‘successful out-
bidders’ (Moore et al., 2014, p. 159) to exploit the fears of their communities while identi-
fying strategies and opportunities for redressing these grievances. Others have examined
the rhetoric of elites and the strategic use of religious (Bunte & Vinson, 2016) or historical
narratives (McGrattan, 2014) to mobilize the followers or to reframe the past after conﬂicts.
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned studies have mainly investigated elites’ frames and
narratives concerning transitional justice or electoral rhetoric. But systematic content or
discourse analyses of the speeches given by MPs of ethnonational parties in post-
conﬂict parliaments have seldom been provided.
In short, research that highlights the interaction between parties in post-conﬂict tran-
sition remains rare. Rather then focusing on electoral behaviours or basing qualitative
research on ‘simple observation’ of attitudes and approaches of political parties, the litera-
ture lacks cross-time assessments of the day-by-day confrontation among elites in local
and national parliaments in post-conﬂict divided societies.
We, therefore, believe that the emphasis on the behaviour of parties in parliament is
important for at least two reasons. First, parliaments are the more suitable context
where post-war parties debate and negotiate and where they can gradually change
their political identity and their attitude towards political rivals. Second, parliamentary
activities are a long-lasting political process in which parties are engaged, much longer
than electoral competitions. Thus, neglecting this important, and often constitutive,
aspect of the parties’ political life would be a serious shortcoming.
Only by looking carefully at the wide range of activities of parties within parliament
research can provide a detailed analysis of how local and national political actors frame
grievances and security dilemmas, express political needs and demands, craft narratives
and ideologies, socialize with other actors, foster accommodative attitudes, adapt recur-
rent patterns of behaviour, and reveal commitment to peace agreements.
Through the support of selected empirical examples, the next paragraph illustrates the
ways through which a more systematic analysis of political parties in legislative arena could
better address the dynamic process of ‘inter-ethnic cooperation’ in post-conﬂict societies.
The aimof the following section is to provide a ‘research agenda’ for further investigation.
This is grounded in selectedcase studies that already include illustrativeelements that canbe
scrutinized in order to look in more depth at post-conﬂict parliaments and party
development.
A research agenda on parties in post-civil wars parliaments
How can a research agenda on parties, parliaments and party systems be structured? How
and to what extent can the interactions among parties be concretely examined within par-
liaments after power-sharing agreements?
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In order to answer the above-mentioned questions, we develop a research agenda
based on three crucial paths. The ﬁrst concerns the strategic dimension of the intergroup
party dynamics in legislative arenas. The second attaints at the symbolic level, more
related to the ways through which parties frame grievances and craft narratives (and
counter-narratives) on fundamental political issues. The last aspect is related to broader
‘normative’ and methodological issues, which also helps in understanding the reasons
behind the limited attention devoted by the literature on party development within leg-
islative arenas. After having examined these three paths though empirical examples the
paper advances potential hypotheses on parties in post-conﬂict parliaments.
The ﬁrst path of the agenda attaints at the intergroup party dynamics in parliaments,
focusing on negotiations around power and interests.
A more detailed examination of legislative ‘intergroup party dynamics’ illustrates the
ways in which political players implement power-sharing, by revealing the accommodation
of grievances, the eﬀective commitment of actors and the attempt to improve infor-
mation, therefore increasing ‘reciprocity’ among groups. Analysis of confrontation
between parties in legislative contexts would lead to a better understanding of the
ways through which actors try to accommodate grievances beyond short-term inter-
actions by expressing their needs and interests in the negotiation. Even though scholars
and practitioners have addressed the problems of how to guarantee eﬀective party com-
mitment after peace agreements (for example, by stressing the vital role played by third
parties and the need to increase the stakes in a shared future), limited research has
been made on the tangible ‘institutional commitment’ of political parties. Thus, parliament
represents an excellent item of investigation for assessing the ‘credibility of commitment’
after power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003), illustrating the participation and involve-
ment of key players in the relevant political issues that require legislative activities. More-
over, parliamentary procedures are fundamental because they ‘set the framework’ for
bargaining among actors, hence regulating the legislative implementation of power-
sharing.
Legislative assemblies highlight formal and informal exchange relations among parties
and the ways through which actors seek to obtain information about each other, which is
crucial for understanding (and potentially even overcoming) the security dilemma in post-
conﬂict societies. Indeed, boosting the counterpart’s level of information may lead to an
increase in reciprocity and extended trust.
The post-conﬂict legislative arenas in Bosnia and Northern Ireland provide useful
examples on the ways through which it is possible to investigate in-depth inter-ethnic
interactions. Hulsey (2015) has illustrated the interactions between Croat and Bosniak
parties (HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union, and SDA – Party for Democratic Action),
which had formed ruling coalitions and worked together.7 Despite consistent relevant
obstacles (such as a market of voters deeply segmented along ethnic lines), inter-ethnic
cooperation exists, also due to the power-sharing mechanisms imposed by the Dayton
agreement (Caspersen, 2004).
Recently, attention has been devoted also to the cases of multi-ethnic parties such as
the SDP – Social Democratic Party and Naša Stranka, a party established with an ‘explicit
anti-nationalist platform’ (Touquet, 2011, p. 456). But while the literature has mainly inves-
tigated the phase(s) of political mobilization, the ways through which these parties behave
within legislative arenas (and how they have aﬀected the ‘rules of the debate’ set by ethnic
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parties) have attracted scarce interest. As recognized by the leader of Naša Stranka,
Kojović, the party ‘made some mistake’,8 collecting useful lessons learnt. By examining
the relationship with other parties in parliaments we can better understand how these
views and perceptions have been inﬂuenced.
The day-by-day analysis of the parliament of the Federation would illustrate the
dynamic interactions as well as the changes occurred within ‘wartime parties’ (in terms
of programmes, reforms, attitudes, etc.), giving additional details also on the reasons
behind the collapse of previous ruling coalitions (as in 2015), as well as on the diﬀerent
needs expressed by the elites across time. For instance, the examination of legislative
debates in municipalities could reveal the cross-time interactions between parties of
some communities (e.g. SDA and SBiH – Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina), their
changes, and the degree of linkage with multi-ethnic parties.
Moreover, rather than focusing only on the electoral competition within crucial ‘mono-
ethnic subunits’ (Hulsey & Stjepanovic, 2017, p. 57), we should look at the dynamic inter-
actions that occur among parties of the same community at the legislative level. It is worth
noticing how the unity of these parties is generally oversimpliﬁed, as the diﬀerent pos-
itions adopted by Bosnian and Croat parties during the constitutional negotiations in
2006, well illustrated.9
Thus, the analysis of (national and local) legislative debates could provide a detailed
account of the priorities and strategies adopted by wartime (and post-war) parties for
inter-ethnic cooperation and competition. On the other hand, these legislative debates
could also shed light on the split occurred within parties, such as in the SDP. As said pre-
viously, more than one party competes for Bosniak, Serb and Croat votes, illustrating a
growing diversiﬁcation of the party system.10
The parliamentary debates concern the national,11 municipal and cantonal dimensions,
where a cross-ethnic majority is technically requested and, therefore, cooperation is more
frequent. Caspersen has examined the inter-ethnic cooperation in heterogeneous munici-
palities, illustrating the diﬀerent alliances built across time in Bosnia despite mutual vetoes
and emphasizing the increasing number of laws adopted by parliaments in recent years.
Indeed, by collecting data on laws and reforms that crosses the ethnic lines, we can better
assess a possible greater pragmatism of wartime parties (Caspersen, 2004, p. 580).
Despite the fact that most decision-making competencies lie with the entities, other
policies (such as transportation, environment, foreign and defense policy) ‘cross entity
lines’, requiring complex negotiations, involving parties in parliaments (Keil & Perry,
2015). An example of a successful reform adopted in those policy areas was the integration
of armed forces in 2006.
On the whole, legislative arenas represent ideal sources to examine such processes of
accommodation among parties in ethnically divided societies, illustrating the voting
behaviour in commissions and in general assemblies. As shown by the literature,
power-sharing mechanisms have the potential to reinforce existing divisions, thanks to
the emergence of leaders of nationalist parties who engage in ethnic outbidding, appeal-
ing to nationalism and thus cementing ethnic representation in the long run.
However, as stated above, recent studies (Garry, 2014) have illustrated the combination
of ethnic outbidding and modernization of post-war parties. The analysis of legislative
debates allows for an understanding of this mechanism, highlighting the pragmatism
and the ‘conciliatory positions’ of former ‘extreme’ ethnonational parties. The legislative
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behaviour of Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party – DUC (which agree to share power
after 2007 in Northern Ireland12) well exempliﬁes such a process of ‘moderate attitudes’
within parliaments, ‘moving away from narrow platforms’ based on ethnic membership
(Gormley-Heenan & MacGinty, 2008). These parties adopted (simultaneously) pragmatic
approaches on resources and intransigent views on identities, thanks to ethnic tribune
appeals. In Northern Ireland the hard-line parties coordinated policies, moving towards
the centre of the political spectrum.
On thewhole, such intentions of ‘de-nationalizing politics’ (Hulsey, 2010) could be better
assessed through a systematic examination of party development within parliaments,
rather than just focusing on executives or on elections. For instance, legislative debates
on issues such as political violence (e.g. condemnations ofmurders after 2007 against desta-
bilization) could reveal diﬀerent approaches and strategies over time, towards a ‘normalisa-
tion of politics’ (Garry, 2009, p. 465) in Northern Ireland. Rather than focus on voters or
opinion polls, the decisions adopted in the legislative arenas (e.g. on controversial issues
such as the Welfare Reform Bill 2015), as well as the rhetoric crafted to justify them, could
better identify examples of pragmatism, moderation or ethno-nationalism.
A comparison of the internal evolution that occurred within Bosnian wartime parties
(especially the HDZ, and the Serbian Democratic Party – SDS) has been made only
before and after electoral campaigns, without examining in details the long-term trans-
formation of their legislative behaviours, at entity and cantonal levels, assessing for
example the variation from mono-ethnic to ‘mixed-ethnic cantons’ (Hulsey, 2010, p. 1143).
Also, the changes occurred in party regulations, especially concerning party ﬁnancing,
represent overestimated sources of information on party systems development. Ishiyama
and Batta (2011, p. 369) have investigated the case of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)
and the process of accommodation with other political actors, identifying the evolution of
strategies, internal struggles, leadership and organization through oﬃcial documents and
debates. The transformation of ‘revolutionary attitudes’ within a speciﬁc ‘ideological back-
ground’ (e.g. concerning land reforms, social services, the future of monarchy, etc.) could
be traced by looking at public speeches within legislative arenas. A detailed account of the
dynamic parliamentary interactions among post-war parties could reveal the speciﬁc issues
where such conciliatory attitudes emerge more frequently.
Finally, by looking at legislative assemblies, it is possible to better monitor how former
rebels gradually become ‘dominant parties’ in the political scenario, as well as the concrete
attempts made by the opposition to balance an increasing inﬂuence on national legis-
lation. In that sense, the parliamentary debates between the Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) represent an excel-
lent example that should be investigated further (Manning, 2007).
In sum, several plausible hypotheses can be developed regarding the intergroup party
dynamics in post-conﬂicts parliaments. First, one can expect that the more shared votes
and attitudes emerge in the day-by-day interactions at legislative levels, the more
parties will draw pragmatic and moderate platforms in further elections, moving gradually
away from narrow programmes based solely on ethnic membership. In other words, a
repeated legislative interaction among parties on relevant political issues could enhance
their ‘institutional commitment’, fostering accommodation and reciprocity. This hypoth-
esis speaks well also with recent research on how political experience aﬀects performance
by former-rebel parties (Manning and Smith 2018).
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Second, and relatedly, only ‘powerful post-war parliaments’ will create incentives for
parties to be actively engaged within the legislative process, promoting compromises
and contrasting potential zero-sum games at the institutional level. On the opposite,
weak parliaments with limited oversight on the executives and on the management of
public resources (e.g. in contexts where patronage networks are extremely active) will
lead parties to focus almost exclusively on symbolic issues, mainly promoting ethnic
tribune appeals.
The second path of the agenda focuses on the symbolic dimension.
How do political actors frame grievances and post-war security dilemmas?
The analysis of the interactions between parties in parliaments helps in identifying narra-
tives, counter-narratives and frames. As illustrated by recent studies on civil wars (Costalli &
Ruggeri, 2015), emotions and ideologies play a very relevant role in the process that leads
from horizontal inequalities to war through the formation of grievances and collective
action. Framing the material conditions, as well as crafting narratives based on anger
and indignation, appears crucial in this sense. Framing speciﬁc or general demands rep-
resent not only symbolic acts but rather it helps in deﬁning (and therefore in defending)
those interests. The ‘emotional reactions’ to horizontal inequalities can be better grasped
by looking at the parliamentary confrontation among (and within) groups. Parliament is an
ideal arena for examining the confrontation between ‘strategic narratives’ based on coop-
erative or confrontational ‘plots’ (e.g. aiming at increasing cooperation or rather hindering
any accommodation) on past conﬂicts. As illustrated by Gromes, ‘intra-party competition
and inter-party contestation oﬀer incentives to inﬂame hatred and fear’ (2009, p. 93).
The cases of Bosnia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland are extremely useful to understand
the role played by historical narratives and the ways through which political parties
(re)framed the past in ethnically divided societies.13 Moore et al. (2014) have stressed
the eﬀective ‘identity based-frames’ adopted by outbidders for mobilizing their commu-
nities. The legislative debates would illustrate in details diagnosis and prognosis frames
(those identifying sources and solutions to problems) as well as the overall narrative dom-
inance (the balance between narratives and counter-narratives) concerning ‘justice’, ‘true’
and ‘memory wars’.
The evolution of frames and narratives crafted in the parliamentary speeches before
national and municipal assemblies on war crime issues in Bosnia or on the sectarian vio-
lence during (and after) the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland represent maybe the most rel-
evant examples to illustrate the impact of signiﬁcant political discourse in divided
societies. The transformation of the party’s ‘wartime image’ could start within the parlia-
ment, promoting more ‘institutional’ political messages, as attempted by the SDS or by
the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) in the Balkans.
Basta (2016, p. 944) has investigated the discursive battleﬁeld on institutional change in
Bosnia, revealing diﬀerent narratives adopted by Bosniak, Serb and Croat parties: ‘formal
institutions may also be symbols that embody narratives about groups identity’. But one
would go further, assessing the ‘narrative dominance’ between ethnic (or post-ethnic) nar-
ratives and counter-narratives among parties within parliaments. The ways through which
leaders and MPs in parliaments have articulated their narratives before other actors,
aﬀecting the transformation of the whole political discourse, still needs to be investigated
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in detail. For example, the consistency (or the lack thereof) between frames adopted by
elites in parliaments and electoral manifestoes elaborated by parties merits attention.
A promising approach has been adopted by Bunte and Vinson (2016), who have ana-
lysed local and informal power-sharing institutions, highlighting the rhetoric of elites in
Nigerian districts. One of the main ﬁndings is that elites in districts with power-sharing
agreements use more cooperative rhetoric and symbolic behaviour towards other reli-
gious groups. Through parliamentary analysis, we can deeply understand the political
demands expressed by parties in the bargaining phases, and focus on power and local
levels of confrontation.
Still few studies have considered the ways through which political entrepreneurs frame
speciﬁc emotions and openly express systems of beliefs. The ‘symbolic capital’ of the post-
war elites has rarely been assessed within a legislative arena, while considerable interest
has been devoted towards the social and political capital of former rebels. Attitudes,
approaches and feelings (e.g. suspicion, trust) are regularly articulated within an assembly,
where ‘hostile leaders’ come to cooperate in the very ﬁrst phases of transitional power-
sharing agreements. Connecting communication studies based on framing, strategic
narratives literature and discourse analysis with civil war research and peacebuilding scho-
larship may help provide a detailed picture of elites’ beliefs and political cultures, which are
a crucial dimension in the dynamic interactions among political actors in post-conﬂict
institutional transition.
In sum, we can suppose that high level of interaction among parties within legislative
contexts featured by power-sharing agreements will be related with strategic narratives
based on cooperative ‘plots’, with shared frames, especially on crucial symbolic issues,
like memory wars. According to such hypothesis, the constant legislative interaction –
and the institutional cooperation on selected issues within parliaments – could shape
similar ‘core frames’ of diﬀerent strategic narratives adopted by post-war parties.
Finally, the third path of the agenda concern methodological issues on p
arties and, parliaments in peacebuilding research and conﬂict studies.
The analysis of political parties in post-conﬂict situations would provide a signiﬁcant
contribution to peace-building processes. As stressed by Carothers (2006), political
parties are the weakest link in many democratic transitions around the world. In addition,
the parliamentary role of parties, a type of party assistance, has seldom been at the centre
of projects and programmes of democratic assistance, which are generally focused on
electoral assistance. As pointed out by Wolf, ‘it is futile to think about power in democracy
promotion without paying attention to the local, trans – and international power relations’
(2015, p. 230). Identifying the crucial domestic actors below leaders, and distinguishing
between moderates and extremists, is a very hard task for peacebuilding operations
because factional divisions and spoilers represent considerable obstacles in developing
peace (Collier, Hoeﬄer, & Rohne, 2006). For this reason, ‘there is a need to identify strat-
egies that discourage the emergence of those who oppose the settlement’ (Hoddie & Hart-
zell, 2010, p. 5). In order to better gauge these strategies, third-party interventions should
increase their level of knowledge on the demands and patterns expressed by the local
elites (Fortna, 2004).
Thus, analysis of the initial bargaining in local assemblies or parliaments could also have
a normative value in fostering knowledge and information on those who are in charge of
promoting peace and stability, and better prevent and contrast the moves by spoilers.
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However, to study the ‘micro narratives’ of political entrepreneurs in a conﬂict-prone or
post-conﬂict scenario methodologically it is necessary to adopt a ‘local perception’. In fact,
qualitative approaches that aim to investigate the frames and narratives of political elites
in a legislative arena should be based on a careful cultural understanding of the object of
the analysis. For instance, some of the most common techniques adopted for examining
legislative debates (e.g. content and discourse analysis) necessitate knowledge of the local
language/s. In other words, a growing scientiﬁc involvement of scholars from the countries
that are under investigation is required. As explicitly recognized by Bunte and Vinsom
(2016, p. 55), who have assessed the number of ‘cooperative and moderating statements
by elites’ in Nigeria, it is problematic to rely on ‘sources that systematically codes types of
statements’ in districts.
However, at least at the national level, there are websites of post-war parliaments that
provide the possibility to investigate in detail the repeated legislative interactions among
parties, their political messages and the existence of confrontational or cooperative
rhetoric.14
Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to provide a research agenda on political parties within parliaments
after civil wars, also advancing possible hypotheses that can be tested in farther studies.
Despite a growing interest, there is still ‘a gap in knowledge about post-war party devel-
opment’ (de Zeeuw 2010, p. 1193).
Analysis of parties in the national and local assemblies allows an examination of the
ways in which parties express political demands, while clarifying the dynamic interactions
among factions, parties, elites, as well as their features, role and commitments, which are
also crucial to better calibrate power-sharing solutions in peacebuilding.
As suggested by recent literature (Belloni, 2012; Groß, 2018), the current research
should devote more attention to the dynamic interaction between international agents
and networks and local actors. Rather than focusing on the technicalities of liberal peace-
building or adopting a ‘romantic’ view of the local actors, we shed light on a potential
middle ground for analysis, illustrating how the dialectic political processes within national
and regional legislative arenas deserve greater attention to understand post-conﬂict
divided societies. Following recent studies on emotions and ideologies, the analysis of
long-term inter-party relationships in the post-war phase may also demonstrate how pol-
itical actors frame grievances, security dilemmas and the ‘narrative dominance’ of the
conﬂict. Finally, adopting a ‘local turn’ in terms of methods (e.g. discourse analysis under-
taken by local scholars) would allow acquiring a more comprehensive picture of the
societies under investigation.
Further studies could investigate in detail how and to what extent diﬀerent levels of
institutionalization – as well as ‘strength’ – of parliaments, aﬀect the system of incentives
for parties in fostering their organization and their propensities to compromise. Additional
analyses could better evaluate the eﬀects of shared votes and attitudes within assemblies,
assessing if ‘strong parliaments’ (with a primary role in the allocation of social resources)
are suitable in facilitating the evolution of parties in post-conﬂict society.
Rather than focusing on formal aspects such as forms of government or constitutions,
further analyses should examine the eﬀective legislative powers (beyond the diﬀerences
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among parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential systems) of post-war parliaments
and the consequential development of political parties.
Notes
1. For an exception see Reilly (2013).
2. Recent exceptions are: Moore et al. (2014) and Bunte and Vinson (2016).
3. For an updated review see Garry (2014).
4. For instance, there aren’t studies that ‘relate power-sharing to democratic survival dynami-
cally’. Graham et al. (2017, p. 687).
5. While the peace-building literature has generally examined elites at the government level, the
paper focuses on the political elites in legislative assemblies. On domestic elites as neglected
(and contested) concept see Grimm and Weiﬀen (2018). On central and secondary elite and
peacebuilding see Zürcher (2018).
6. Marshall and Ishiyama investigated the long-term inclusion of former-rebel groups by looking
at the proportion of seats held during the legislature. However, they do not provide detailed
analyses on the tangible interactions between former-rebel groups in the legislative context.
7. See, for instance: ‘Parties Start New Coalition Talks in Bosnia’s Federation’, available at http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/talks-start-on-new-ruling-coalition-in-bosnia-s-
federation#sthash.9rxa62f2.dpuf.
8. Quoted in Touquet (2011, p. 458).
9. SDA supported the initiative while SBiH opposed it. Also the HDZ and the HDZ 1990 voted in
diﬀerent ways (Basta, 2016, p. 956).
10. In Bosnia there are nearly ‘200 parties competing in national, regional, and local elections’
(Hulsey & Stjepanovic, 2017, p. 43).
11. The lower chamber of the Bosnian assembly is elected according to a proportional system.
Ethnicity plays a diﬀerent role according to the mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic nature of
diﬀerent national or local institutions.
12. On consociationalism and Northern Ireland see: McGarry and O’Leary (2006).
13. The ‘state-sponsored denial’ of the genocide in Srebrenica is a relevant example (McGrattan,
2014).
14. For instance, the minutes of the debates in Sierra Leone are available also in English. See
http://www.parliament.gov.sl. See also recent projects on parliaments and civil society such
as: http://parliaments4people.com/projects/
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